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Who Gains from Credit Granted between Firms? 
Evidence from Inter-corporate Loan Announcements Made in China 
 
Abstract 
Who gains from inter-corporate credit? To answer this question we measure the 
impact of the announcements of inter-corporate loans in China on the stock prices of 
the firms involved. We find that the average abnormal return for the issuers of 
inter-corporate loans is significantly negative, whereas it is positive for the receivers. 
Firms issuing inter-group loans may be perceived by investors to have run out of 
worthwhile projects to finance, although the loans may bring benefits to these firms 
through the high interest revenues involved. Firms receiving these inter-group loans 
are being certified as creditworthy borrowers, although the cost on these loans may be 
high. Issuance of intra-group loans on the other hand may signal the propping up of 
financially distressed subsidiaries and their resultant expropriation in the future and 
the firms granting and receiving such loans will be assessed accordingly. Subsequent 
investment and firm performance confirms these immediate valuations as overall 
accurate. 
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JEL classification: G30, G140, G210 
  
1. Introduction 
Credit between firms plays a crucial role in many economies around the world 
(Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006)). Firms with limited access to intermediated funds 
rely heavily on financial inter-linkages with other firms (Gopalan, Nanda and Seru 
(2007)). This is particularly important in emerging economies, where the legal 
systems are weak. The absence of adequate legal enforcement makes it burdensome 
for firms to raise external financing (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997)), which may lead to credit rationing of formal finance by financial institutions. 
Inter-corporate lending may be less subject to credit rationing and therefore may 
support the high growth in emerging economies like China (Allen, Qian and Qian 
(2005)). 
Despite their ubiquity, research on inter-corporate credit continues to be 
hampered by a lack of direct firm-to-firm level data.1 Thus, the inner workings of 
inter-corporate loans remain relatively unexplored. In this paper, we assemble a 
unique dataset to study the announcements of inter-corporate loans in the Chinese 
stock market during 2005-2012.2 Indeed, as small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) may face substantial obstacles in obtaining bank credit (Poncet, Steingress 
and Vandenbussche (2010)), the Chinese government has allowed firms to obtain 
credit from other non-financial firms under the coordination of financial institutions. 
                                                 
1 Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2014) study U.S. firms’ liquidity positions and Boissay and 
Gropp (2014) study defaults on payments to suppliers in France. Jacobson and Von Schedvin (2015) and 
Ellingsen, Jacobson and von Schedvin (2016) study a dataset that contains 52 million trade credit 
contracts issued by 51 suppliers over 9 years to about 199,000 unique customers in Sweden. See also 
Petersen and Rajan (1997), Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende (2007), and Burkart, Ellingsen and Giannetti 
(2011), among others. 
2 Relying on similar data sources Allen, Qian, Tu and Yu (2016) examine the role played by 
inter-corporate loans in shadow banking, while Chen, Ren and Zha (2016) study monetary policy 
transmission and small bank risk-taking through the brokering of this lending. 
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These inter-corporate loans, also called “entrusted loans”, are playing an increasingly 
important role in supplying credit to firms in China.3 
The inter-corporate loans must be disclosed as a separate report of listed firms 
according to Chinese regulations.4 We can therefore observe the market reactions for 
inter-corporate loans, which is an important advantage over other studies. Analyzing 
stock market reactions to a corporate financing event can provide an immediate and 
comprehensive assessment for the valuation effect of such an event (Palmrose, 
Richardson and Scholz (2004)). We thereby break new ground in inter-corporate loan 
research by providing novel evidence on the reactions of the stock prices to 
inter-corporate loan announcements for both the issuing and the receiving firms. 
Furthermore, comprehensive information disclosed in the inter-corporate loan 
announcements enables us to glean specifics on the lending behavior involved, i.e., 
the relationship between lender and borrower, maturity, interest rate and collateral. To 
the best of our knowledge, there is no other published work that has studied − from a 
valuation perspective − a dataset with such comprehensive information on 
inter-corporate loans. 
Inter-corporate loans can be categorized as inter- or intra-group loans, depending 
on whether the lender and borrower are affiliated with a different or the same business 
                                                 
3 According to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), an entrusted loan is a type of loan 
in which the lender (i.e., the principal) extends credit to the borrower (i.e., the trustee) at specified 
amount, maturity, interest rate, and usage of the loan. Banks and other financial institutions only act as 
account managers who earn commissions but bear no default risk. Instead, the lending firm bears all the 
default risk. Entrusted loans amounted to 2.55 trillion RMB in 2013 (i.e., about $400 billion) and 
accounted for 14.7 percent of the total amount of financing in the country. Data source: People’s Bank of 
China. The increase in entrusted loans in 2013 was equivalent to nearly 30 percent of bank loans, which 
almost doubled the portion of 2012. The Wall Street Journal featured reports on entrusted loans in China 
on December 8th, 2011, and May 1st, 2014. 
4 The CSRC requires all listed firms to announce major events which may influence their stock prices. 
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group. When the firm grants a loan to another firm outside the business group, it is 
called an inter-group loan. 
In economies with underdeveloped legal and financial systems, credit provided 
by financial institutions may be rationed. Firms face substantial obstacles in accessing 
formal finance, which thus rely heavily on alternative financing channels based on 
reputation and relationship. The alternative financing channels have advantages in 
alleviating information asymmetry and also in enhancing contract enforcement even 
in the absence of official contracts, and therefore can support the high growth rates 
observed in an emerging economy like China (Allen, Qian and Qian (2005)). 
Inter-group lending, which in essence is a type of informal financing based on 
reputation and inter-firm relationships, may alleviate the credit rationing that exists in 
the formal financial sector. For example, one firm may have abundant cash, while the 
other may have promising investment opportunities in need of external financing. 
Inter-group lenders (e.g., suppliers) can often access insider information and have 
enforcement advantages over financial institutions, so inter-group loans could 
redistribute credit to more profitable firms in an efficient way. Thus, investors may 
react positively to the announcement of inter-group loans for the receiving firms. The 
issuance of inter-group loans, however, may covey a signal that the issuing firms are 
running out of worthy projects to finance, thus generating a negative market reaction 
on the stock prices of the issuing firms. 
A firm may also lend to another firm within the same business group, which is 
then called an intra-group loan. In countries with underdeveloped external financial 
markets, firms often resort to the internal capital market of their business group, e.g., 
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intra-group loans reallocate credit among member firms of business groups (Gopalan, 
Nanda and Seru (2007)). 
There is a strand of literature on how credit is allocated in the internal capital 
markets. Stein (1997), among others, shows that an internal capital market can 
channel funds from firms with lower investment opportunities to others with higher 
profitable investment opportunities. Intra-group lenders often know more about the 
prospects of the borrowing firms than others such as banks. As an intra-group loan 
agreement is a type of fund flowing within the internal capital market, it may add 
value to both the receiving firms and the business group as a whole through a 
value-enhancing credit re-allocation among member firms. Furthermore, internal 
capital markets within business groups may provide a supporting mechanism for a 
financially distressed subsidiary to avoid default (Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007); 
Khanna and Yafeh (2005)). 
However, Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003) show that credit re-allocation 
from financially healthy firms to financially distressed firms may constitute 
“corporate propping-up”, involving potential expropriation in the future. According to 
this hypothesis, the intra-group loan may be granted to support affiliated firms in 
financial distress, while allowing corporate insiders to expropriate private benefits in 
good times. The issuance of intra-group loans may convey a signal of such 
propping-up for receiving firms, while it may also lead to a credit misallocation and 
an increased expropriation risk for the business group as a whole. 
Finally, a distortion in the internal capital markets could enable corporate 
insiders to extract private benefits of control (Scharfstein and Stein (2000); Fan, Jin 
and Zheng (2014)), or to engage in tunneling and expropriating corporate resources 
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(Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000); Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2000); Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002)). Thus, intra-group loans 
may be used by corporate insiders to expropriate outside investors. So the information 
content of intra-group loans depends on the efficiency of the resource re-allocation 
among member firms within business groups. As a result, the market reactions to 
intra-group loan announcements provide us a valuable benchmark to shed light on 
both the bright and dark side of internal capital markets. 
To address the aforementioned issues, we examine market reactions to a sample 
of 719 hand-collected inter-corporate loans announced between 2005 and 2012. There 
are 155 announcements made by the borrowers and 564 announcements made by the 
lenders. Using a standard market model, we document a statistically significant 
two-day (day -1 to day 0) cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 91 basis points (bps) 
on the stocks of the borrowing firms, and a CAR of -42 bps on the stocks of the 
lending firms. 
When we divide our sample according to whether the lender and the borrower 
are affiliated with the same business group, we find that the receipt of both 
inter-group and intra-group loans generates significantly positive CARs. It is 
consistent with a certification effect by these non-financial corporate lenders of the 
borrowing firms, which is similar with the role of traditional banks. The positive 
announcement effects for the receipt of inter-group loans stands in pointed contrast to 
the findings in Bailey, Huang and Yang (2011) and Huang, Schwienbacher and Zhao 
(2012): They show that bank loan announcements in China result in negative 
abnormal returns for the borrowing firms. This may be due to banks’ limited 
information and their well-known soft budget problem. Hence lenders of inter-group 
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loans may have better private information and be less subject to social and political 
pressure to subsidize low-quality firms. Thus, receiving an inter-group loan in China 
may provide the type of certification similar to that associated with the receipt of a 
bank loan in the U.S. (James (1987)). However, a positive market reaction to the 
receipt of intra-group loans is consistent both with a certification of firms’ quality, and 
with a credible commitment to prop up the receiving firms by their affiliated lenders. 
To further distinguish the certification effect of intra-group loans, we 
disaggregate intra-group loans according to the relationship between the lenders and 
borrowers, i.e., we distinguish between subsidiaries, controlling shareholders, and 
firms with another relationship. We find that the issuance of intra-group loans is 
associated with significantly negative market reactions to the stocks of these affiliated 
lenders, which is mainly driven by intra-group loans to their subsidiaries. Intra-group 
loan to subsidiaries serves as a channel of credit re-allocation within business groups.5 
If intra-group loans to subsidiaries certify a value-enhancing credit reallocation, it will 
exhibit a positive market reaction to the announcements of intra-group loan issuances. 
If intra-group loans are employed to support financially distressed subsidiaries, it will 
exhibit a negative market reaction to the announcements of intra-group loan issuances. 
We find that the empirical evidence is consistent with the latter hypothesis, i.e., 
intra-group loans are primarily employed to prop up financially distressed affiliates. 
Thus, issuing intra-group loans may indicate a misallocation of financial resources 
and lead to an increased default risk for the lending firm. Besides, we also find 
                                                 
5 As a majority proportion of the issuance of intra-group loans goes to wholly owned subsidies of listed 
firms, it rules out the possibility of tunneling and expropriations. 
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negative CARs for the issuance of inter-group loans, which signals a lack of worthy 
projects for the lending firms to finance. 
Consistent with the above findings, intra-group loan agreements have larger loan 
amounts, lower interest rates, less collateral requirements and longer maturities than 
inter-group loan agreements. For example, firms can receive relatively more favorable 
credit terms (consistent with propping-up) from their affiliated lenders. In contrast, 
inter-group loans are more likely to be scrutinized by these non-financial corporate 
lenders. Furthermore, the CARs for both the receipt and issuance of inter-corporate 
loans are lower for loans with a higher interest rate spread. For the receipt of 
inter-corporate loans, it is consistent with the literature that favorable credit 
agreements can convey proprietary information to uninformed investors, which leads 
to a certification effect similarly as traditional bank loans. We also find that the 
revisions of inter-corporate loans are associated with higher market reactions, which 
are consistent with Lummer and McConnell (1989) and suggest a scrutiny by these 
non-financial corporate lenders. However, this relationship is muted when we restrict 
our sample to intra-group loans, which indicates a corporate propping-up instead of 
scrutiny by these affiliated lenders. 
Furthermore, we investigate the factors affecting the likelihood of issuing or 
receiving inter-corporate loans. Firms with higher market to book ratio are less likely 
to issue inter-group loans, while the issuance of intra-group loans does not depend on 
this ratio. In contrast, firms with higher market to book ratio are more likely to receive 
inter-group loans, while the receipt of intra-group loans does not depend on it. 
Besides, state-controlled firms are more likely to issue and receive intra-group loans 
while this is not the case for inter-group loans, which suggests a potential credit 
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misallocation by the state-owned enterprises. The issuance of inter-corporate loans 
generates lower CARs for loans to intra-group borrowers, and also for loans by 
lenders with higher market-to-book ratios and other accounts receivable (i.e., a proxy 
for inter-corporate loans outstanding). The receipt of inter-corporate loans is 
associated with lower CARs for loans from state-owned lenders and loans to non-state 
controlled borrowers. The results support the hypothesis that the issuance of 
inter-corporate loans signals a lack of worthy projects to finance in the lending firms, 
while the issuance of intra-group loans conveys a resource misallocation through 
propping-up and also potential financial distress in the borrowing affiliated firms. 
Finally, we provide some suggesting evidence on the consequences of 
inter-corporate loans for the investment and performance for both issuers and 
receivers. We find that investment decreases significantly for firms with high market 
to book ratio that issue intra-group loans, while it is insignificant for firms with low 
market to book ratio that receive intra-group loans. In addition, the investment 
decreases for firms with high market to book ratio that issue inter-group loans, while 
it is insignificant for firms with low market to book ratio (and different from those 
with a high ratio). In contrast, investment increases for firms with a high market to 
book ratio that receive inter-group loans; although the latter effect is only marginal, 
there is a significant difference in investment between firms that receive intra-group 
versus inter-group loans. It confirms the signaling of a lack of investment 
opportunities in the issuing firms of inter-group loans in particular for firms with high 
market to book ratio, and a certification effect for the receiving firms of inter-group 
loans in particular for firms with high market to book ratio. Due to the propping-up 
concerns for intra-group loans, the firms receiving these loans do not increase their 
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investment, which confirms the inefficiency of internal capital market in relocating 
credit within the business group. 
The evidence also suggests that the profitability declines after the issuance of 
inter-corporate loans, in particular for firms with high growth opportunities.6 In 
contrast, we find no evidence that the profitability increases after the receipt of 
inter-corporate loans even for firms with high growth opportunities, which may be 
caused by an inefficient internal capital market for firms receiving intra-group loans, 
and a high interest burden for firms receiving inter-group loans. For the inter-group 
loans, the market reactions to the issuance announcements confirm a lack of 
worthwhile projects to finance in the issuing firms. For the intra-group loans, it 
confirms that lenders provide a propping-up for their affiliated firms at the expense of 
profit deterioration in the business group (the lenders). These results are broadly 
consistent with the “propping up” hypothesis for the internal capital markets. 
Intra-group loans enhance the valuation of the receiving firms, while endanger the 
valuation in the business group as a whole due to a resource misallocation through 
propping-up and increased default risk in the future. 
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we provide 
novel evidence on the market reactions to the announcements of inter-corporate loans, 
which contributes to the literature on information production by non-financial firms as 
creditors besides banks and non-bank financial institutions (Best and Zhang (1993); 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995)). We show that the receipt of inter-corporate 
loans from non-financial firms is associated with positive market reactions, which 
                                                 
6 Put differently, credit is misallocated when firms with high growth potential issue inter-corporate loans 
to others, while this is not so for firms with low growth potential. 
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indicates a certification effect by these non-financial corporate lenders. Second, our 
study is also related with the literature on the internal capital market of business 
groups (Stein (1997); Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007)). Our results are consistent 
with the propping-up hypothesis for the business groups in emerging markets, which 
can enhance the valuation of the receiving firms. However, it may lead to a wealth 
loss in the business group as a whole, i.e., uninformed investors may perceive the use 
of internal capital markets as a signal of credit misallocation and increased default 
risks in the future. One unique contribution of our paper is to provide direct evidence 
on who gains from the credit granted between affiliated firms within business groups. 
The announcements of intra-group loans enable us to measure the wealth implications 
for credit reallocation among affiliated firms within business groups. 
Finally, our findings can also shed light on the operation of informal credit 
market and provide direct evidence on the market reactions to the credit reallocation 
between business groups (Allen, Qian and Qian (2005)). We show that the extension 
of inter-corporate loans to unaffiliated firms (i.e., informal loans) is associated with a 
positive (negative) market reaction for the stock prices of receiving (issuing) firms, 
particularly for firms with higher growth opportunities. It suggests that issuing firms 
may run out of profitable projects to finance, and thus extend credit to other firms 
with higher growth opportunities. Uninformed investors may see these non-financial 
corporate lenders as more efficient in screening and monitoring the borrowers than 
traditional financial institutions. As a result, the credit reallocation among unaffiliated 
firms corrects the market distortions to some extent in the absence of a 
well-developed legal and financial system. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the Chinese 
financial system. Section 3 sets out our hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the data and 
methodology. Section 5 provides summary statistics, determinants of loan issuance 
and receiving, and event studies of the issuance and receipt of inter-corporate loans. 
Section 6 links CARs to a set of loan, counter-party and firm-specific characteristics. 
Section 7 presents additional analyses on ex-post behaviors. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional background 
2.1 The financial system in China 
The formal financial sector is dominated by commercial banks in China (Allen, 
Qian and Qian (2005)) with a bank credit to GDP ratio (1.11) that is substantially 
higher than the average for the other countries in their sample (0.73). According to the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, banks provided 51.4 percent of the total 
financing for Chinese firms in 2013. The banking system in China consists of a 
central bank, four large (national) state-owned banks, 7  three policy banks, 12 
(regional) joint-stock banks, hundreds of local banks (i.e., city/rural commercial banks, 
rural cooperative banks, and village and town banks), and city/rural credit 
cooperatives, etc. There are also hundreds of branches and offices of foreign banks 
which can conduct a limited set of commercial banking activities in China (Allen, 
Qian, Zhang and Zhao (2013)). Generally speaking, the four large state-owned banks 
dominate the banking market in China. In particular state-owned banks are mandated 
                                                 
7 The four large stated-owned banks are Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, 
Construction Bank of China and Agriculture Bank of China. 
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to pursue social benefits and stability, and their credit allocation is often based on 
some “noisy” information about the borrowers and not on commercial judgment 
(Bailey, Huang and Yang (2011)). Moreover, small and private firms have limited 
credit histories and collaterals, and will not receive government bailouts in case of 
defaults. Thus, banks favor lending to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and large 
private firms, and discriminate against small and private firms in China (Firth, Lin 
and Wong (2008)). 
The capital market, which mainly consists of a bond market and an equity market, 
is also relatively underdeveloped in China. The bond market remains under-developed 
until recent years, although corporate bonds were first issued in as early as 1986. The 
market value of newly issued bonds in China was only 1.74 percent of GDP at the end 
of 2012, and corporate bond issuance accounts for just 11.19 percent of total bond 
issuance in China. In contrast, the newly established Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange have enjoyed rapid expansion since their founding in 1990. 
As measured by total market capitalization, both of these stock exchanges ranked in 
the world’s top ten at the end of 2011. However, the combined stock market 
capitalization is still quite small compared to the banking system. The market 
capitalization-to-GDP ratio was 52 percent in 2011 in China, which is much lower 
than the U.S. level. Despite its rapid growth, the stock market does not play a proper 
role in the country, where insider trading and speculation are prevalent (He and Rui 
(2014)). For example, the turnover rates on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges are 178.5 and 344.3 percent, respectively, which is higher than most 
industrial countries and may indicate a widespread speculative trading (Allen, Qian, 
Zhang and Zhao (2013)). Moreover, the two stock exchanges were established so as to 
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provide a new source of funding for SOEs and to reduce the financial burden of 
government bailouts. Up until 2005, about 80 percent of the (more than 1,100) listed 
enterprises were converted from SOEs in China, while a majority of listed firms are 
still owned or controlled by the government nowadays. The Chinese government’s 
dual role as both regulators and shareholders reduces the effectiveness of the stock 
market in terms of resource allocation and risk diversification. 
In sum, China is an emerging economy with an under-developed financial 
market with widespread state intervention and financial repression. Credit constrained 
borrowers especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) often resort to 
alternative financing channels as a major source for credit. Thus, the informal 
financing channels have become essential for the success of the corporations in the 
country, e.g. inter-corporate credit and internal capital markets, etc. 
 
2.2 Inter-corporate loans 
With the formal banking sector and capital markets primarily serving the SOEs 
and large private firms, SMEs face substantial obstacles in obtaining bank credit and 
thus often resort to alternative financing channels. Based on the reputation in the 
community and long-term relationship, informal financing may channel credit from 
state-owned and large private firms to SMEs thus supporting a fast growth of the 
Chinese economy (Bose (1998); Allen, Qian and Qian (2005)). A well-functioning 
informal financing system may fill in the gap due to their advantages in screening, 
monitoring, and enforcement versus traditional banks (Stiglitz (1990); Arnott and 
Stiglitz (1991)). 
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One type of informal financing channel is the inter-corporate loan. Because 
direct lending activities among non-financial firms are prohibited in China before 
2015, entrusted loans have moved in to facilitate the inter-corporate lending.8 Under 
financial regulations in China, non-financial firms can extend credit to other firms via 
entrusted loans in a process that is coordinated by banks and other financial 
institutions (banks hereafter). Lenders and borrowers can negotiate loan terms subject 
to certain financial regulations regarding for example loan amount, interest rate, 
maturity, and purpose, etc.9 Banks merely act as agents on behalf of the lenders and 
coordinate the loan procedures, e.g., the contract signing, loan withdrawals, and 
repayment, etc. However, banks do not bear any default risk for the entrusted loans, 
which are often treated as off-balance sheet items by banks. Appendix 1 gives a 
timeline for the related laws and regulations on entrusted loans (for what we will 
henceforth call inter-corporate loans). 
The Chinese financial authorities imposed only a mild set of regulations on 
inter-corporate loans because of their beneficial effect on credit reallocation. The 
market for inter-corporate loans has witnessed a rapid expansion with the gradual 
liberalization of interest rates in China, and it has recently become a key source of 
financing.10 The interest rate ceiling for inter-corporate loans was abolished by the 
                                                 
8 On March 8th, 1993, People’s Bank of China (PBOC) promulgated administrative decrees on entrusted 
loans as regards financial trust companies. On April 5th, 2001, the PBOC released a regulation on 
entrusted loans, “Issues on Commercial Banks’ Provision for Launching Entrusted Loans”. For an 
overview of the evolution of financial regulation of entrusted loans in China, see Appendix 1 for a survey 
of the laws and regulations relating to entrusted loans. 
9 “Lending General Provisions” by the People’s Bank of China were formulated in accord with the “Law 
of the Commercial Banks” and other relevant laws on August 1st, 1996. Article 7 states that entrusted 
loans should comply with the “Lending General Provisions”. 
10 The interest rates are under extensive regulation by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). PBOC set the 
benchmark interest rate along with a rate floor and rate ceiling. The interest rate is only allowed to vary 
within specified bounds. For example, PBOC set the benchmark lending rates, and the interest rate of 
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People’s Bank of China (PBOC) in October 2004, which enabled lenders to negotiate 
freely with borrowers on interest rates. Appendix 2 shows that the market share of 
inter-corporate loans has been growing rapidly, accounting for 15 percent of total 
financing in 2013 (the second largest financing source besides bank lending) and 
totaling 2.55 trillion RMB. 
The rapid expansion of the inter-corporate loan business is a natural outcome of 
widespread financial repressions in China. On the one hand, there is favoritism toward 
SOEs and large private firms in accessing external finance. On the other hand, a 
substantial part of these firms are affiliated with a business group (Fisman and Wang 
(2010)), which can help them spin off bad assets and meet the IPO requirements by 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) (Fan, Jin and Zheng (2014)). 
These firms typically become much larger and more transparent after IPOs, and thus 
have a higher financial capacity and abundant credit, which can be channeled to 
unaffiliated SMEs in higher interest rates,11 or reallocated to other member firms in 
need of liquidity within the same business group. Thus, firms in need of credit could 
employ the abundant credit of other firms to finance their investment opportunities. 
Furthermore, firms with abundant credit can receive substantial interest revenues 
                                                                                                                                            
commercial loans, including entrusted loans, must be between the floor and ceiling around the 
benchmark lending rate. China began its interest rate liberalization in 1996 by abolishing the ceiling on 
interbank lending rates. From 1998 to 2004, the ceiling for the lending rates gradually raised, and was 
abolished in October 2004 (except for credit cooperatives), while the floor remained unchanged at 90% 
of the benchmark lending rate. Recently, China took a further step toward a market-oriented rate by 
removing the lending rate floor on July 19th, 2013. 
11 June 25th, 2013 (Reuters) - A deputy general manager in a state-owned steel firm says that the firm 
doesn’t use the bank credit to expand production, as the average loss is 100 - 200 RMB per ton of steel 
sold. Entrusted loans are an attractive business option for his company. The firm borrows from banks at 
the benchmark lending rate (about six percent), and issues inter-corporate loans to borrowers at twice that 
rate. 
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through extending inter-corporate loans with high interest rates, which may even 
constitute their major sources for profit.12 
If the Chinese economy stays in a booming period, the transactions of entrusted 
loans seem to be safe and benefit both the lenders and borrowers. Nevertheless, the 
rapid expansion of entrusted loans has generated substantial concern about the credit 
risks involved in light of the gloomy prospects for the Chinese economy since the 
global financial crisis.13 Although there is only a limited number of defaults on these 
loans up until now,14 the risks of inter-corporate lending can increase the systemic 
risks of the financial system as such credit often ends up in the real estate market and 
investment platforms of local municipal governments, which have become a major 
concern for the financial stability in China. 
Despite its increasing importance in reallocating credit among corporations, little 
is known about the inner working mechanism of these inter-corporate loan agreements 
and their impacts on corporate valuations. Employing a unique setting of mandatory 
disclosure requirement for inter-corporate loans by the CSRC, we try to fill in this gap 
by examining the market reactions to the announcements of issuance and receipt of 
inter-corporate loans, and their associated consequences on the corporate investment 
                                                 
12 For example, the Zhejiang Longsheng Group Co., Ltd, a listed firm in Shanghai Stock Exchange (i.e. 
stock ID: 600352), says in its 2012 earnings report that it earns 93.4 million RMB from extending loans 
to other firms, which accounts for about half of its operating profits (189.2 million RMB). 
13 May 2, 2014 (Wall Street Journal)-the Zhejiang Longsheng Co. Ltd, a listed firm in Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (i.e. stock ID: 600352) reports that the company has earned 21.9 million RMB from the 
lending to other companies in 2013 with interest rates ranging from 23% to 25%, which decreases by 
77% from the level of 2012. 
14 For example, the Sunny Loan Top Co., Ltd, a listed firm in Shanghai Stock Exchange (i.e. stock ID: 
600830), on 7th Jun, 2014, reports 1.12 billion RMB entrusted loans outstanding at the end of 2013, 
among which 306 million is classified as doubtful and 5 million is classified as losses. 
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and performance. Our paper therefore can cast light on the welfare implications of the 
inter-corporate loan as a type of informal financing channels. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
Institutional lenders, such as banks, can enhance firm valuation by alleviating the 
information asymmetry of borrowers (Fama (1985); Boot (2000); Ongena and Smith 
(2000)). Approval of a bank loan is often perceived by uninformed investors as a good 
signal, especially for borrowers who suffer from severe information asymmetries. The 
positive excess returns on borrowers` stocks following bank loan announcements are 
widely documented in the literature. For example, James (1987) finds positive CARs 
of almost 200 basis points in a two-day period surrounding bank loan 
announcements.15 Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) show significant positive 
CARs on loans from non-bank financial institutions which are indistinguishable from 
bank loans. However, Lummer and McConnell (1989) show that the market reacts 
positively to loan renewals but not to new bank loan agreements. 
The CARs on bank loan announcements are higher for borrowers who suffer 
more from information asymmetries (Best and Zhang (1993)), for example these 
could be the smaller borrowers (Maskara and Mullineaux (2011)). Certain types of 
lenders can also better alleviate the information asymmetry of bank loan agreements, 
as in the case of internationally syndicated loans in emerging economies (Harvey, 
Lins and Roper (2004)); for example also foreign or local banks, except for domestic 
                                                 
15 Following work by Mikkelson and Partch (1986). James and Smith (2000) and Degryse, Kim and 
Ongena (2009) provide a critical review of the methodology and the extant empirical evidence. 
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banks that are located far from their borrowers, may play that role (Ongena and 
Roscovan (2013)); or lenders with higher credit ratings (Billett, Flannery and 
Garfinkel (1995)). 
However, the CARs on bank loan announcements change over time. Fields, 
Fraser, Berry and Byers (2006) for example show that CARs on bank loan 
announcements were positive in the 1970s and 1980s, whereas they disappeared 
afterwards except for smaller and poorly performing firms and periods of high credit 
risk spreads, a result also present in samples studied by Andre, Mathieu and Zhang 
(2001) and Ongena, Roscovan, Song and Werker (2014) for example. And Li and 
Ongena (2015) find that the CARs on bank loan announcements were positive during 
the global financial crisis although they were close to zero before that. They surmise 
that in a booming credit market the certification of corporate borrowers by banks 
started to play a lesser role, while during the crisis the banks’ role was revitalized. 
Wang and Xia (2014) show that banks exert less effort in ex-ante screening and 
ex-post monitoring when they can securitize loans, which may also explain the 
changes in CARs on bank loans over the time. 
There are also some studies investigating the loan announcement effect for 
lending institutions. For example, Megginson, Poulsen and Sinkey (1995) show that 
the announcements of syndicated loans to Latin American borrowers in the 1970s 
have negative CARs for the lending banks, while syndicated loans to U.S. borrowers 
in the 1980s have positive CARs. 
However, bank credits are often granted based on non-commercial criteria and 
noisy insider information for prospective borrowers in emerging economies with an 
absence of adequate legal and financial systems. Under such a scenario, banks do not 
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screen or monitor borrowers in a proper way, which results in inefficient lending and 
thus credit misallocation in the country. For example, Bailey, Huang and Yang (2011) 
show that the announcements of bank loans are associated with negative CARs on the 
borrower’s stock, and obtaining bank loans predicts poorer subsequent performance 
of borrowers in China. Due to a malfunctioning of the formal credit market, an 
increasing literature has documented the existence and role played by informal credit 
market. Based on reputation and relationship, informal financial system can better 
screen and monitor the borrowers, and enforce loan repayment than banks and other 
financial institutions (Tsai (2002); Allen, Qian and Qian (2005)). 
 
3.1 Inter-group loans 
Inter-corporate loan, in particular those made among firms not affiliated with the 
same business group (inter-group loan), is an essential informal financing channel for 
firms that are shut out of formal credit market. Under an efficient informal credit 
market, inter-group loans should occur among firms with certain business 
relationships, e.g., customers, suppliers, or firms in the same industry, etc. Thus, the 
lending firms of inter-group loans may have an informational advantage over banks in 
screening and monitoring the borrowers. Furthermore, lenders may suffer a 
substantial loss in case of loan defaults, which incentivizes lending firms to acquire 
proprietary information about the borrowers ex ante, e.g., through long-term business 
relationship, supplier-customer relationship, or personal relationship with the CEOs, 
etc. As a result, obtaining an inter-group loan resembles traditional bank loans in 
industrial countries, which certifies the borrowers and conveys positive information to 
uninformed investors. Therefore, such an announcement should be good news for the 
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receiving firms, which can lead to significantly positive excess returns on the stock of 
these receiving firms. 
A typical non-financial firm should mainly engage in the production of goods 
and non-financial services. Thus, the issuance of inter-group loans may signal to 
uninformed investors that the issuing firms have run out of worthwhile projects to 
finance, even though the inter-group loans indeed improve the credit allocation in the 
issuing firms as in Hoff and Stiglitz (1997) and Bose (1998).16 Needless to say, 
lenders can benefit from inter-group loans via a substantially high interest rate than 
alternative investments (e.g., bank deposits). If the negative signaling effect of the 
growth opportunity dominates the positive credit reallocation effect, the 
announcements for the issuance of inter-group loans should end up in a negative 
market reaction to the stock prices of the receiving firms. 
We also examine the real consequence of inter-group loans for the investment 
and performance of the receiving and issuing firms. Inter-group loans may provide 
alternative financing channels for high growing but credit constrained firms, i.e., 
relocate credit from firms with low growth opportunities to firms with high growth 
opportunities. Thus, the receiving firms may use the credit to increase their 
investment, while the issuing firms may reduce their investment due to a lack of 
worthwhile projects to finance. We expect that the investment after the 
announcements of inter-group loans should increase for the receiving firms while it 
should decrease for the issuing firms. However, the implication of inter-group loans 
on firm’s performance is not clear. On the one hand, corporate performance may be 
                                                 
16 Similarly, Yook (2003) show that the acquirers’ stock prices suffer from negative market reactions to 
M&A announcements, which may indicate that the acquirers have run out of other worthwhile projects to 
finance. 
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improved (deteriorated) after the receipt (issuance) of inter-group loans, as the credit 
is channeled from low-productivity to high-productivity firms. On the other hand, 
interest revenues from inter-group loans could partially off-set the deteriorating 
performance of the issuing firms, but it may erode the profits of receiving firms due to 
cumbersome financial burdens. Although the interest rates of inter-group loans are 
often much higher than the basis lending rate, the interest revenues may not fully 
off-set the profit deterioration due to a lack of worthwhile projects to finance, thus 
ending up in a declining corporate performance in the issuing firms. Nonetheless, a 
high interest payment can outweigh the benefits of investing in profitable projects by 
the receiving firms, which may not lead to an improvement of corporate performance 
in the receiving firms. 
 
3.2 Intra-group loan 
Business groups often employ intra-group loans to reallocate credit among 
affiliated firms. In countries with under-developed legal and financial systems, firms 
are often affiliated with business groups to overcome financial constraints in raising 
external finance (Claessens, Fan and Lang (2006); Bae and Vidhan (2009)). Firms 
with good investment opportunities can obtain credit through the internal capital 
markets when the headquarters of the business group can allocate credit efficiently 
among group firms (Stein (1997)). Indeed, Buchuk, Larrain, Muñoz and Urzúa I. 
(2014) find that intra-group loans in Chile actually enhance firm investment and 
performance. Furthermore, Almeida, Kim and Kim (2015) show that internal capital 
markets of Korea business groups mitigate the negative effects on investment and 
performance during the Asian financial crisis. 
 22 
 
Business groups, however, may also come with a potential dark side, especially 
in emerging economies with weak investor protections. Ownership is often 
concentrated in business groups, and voting rights exceed cash flow rights through 
pyramid structures and cross-holdings by controlling shareholders in emerging 
economies (Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000)). Thus, a majority of decision rights 
are often in the hands of corporate insiders, which may enable them to tunnel 
corporate resources for private benefits (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (2000)). For example, an extensive literature has identified tunneling 
activities in emerging economies with inadequate legal protections for investors 
(Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002); Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003); 
Baek, Kang and Lee (2006); Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010)). 
Certain ownership structures enable controlling shareholders to engage in 
tunneling, while it may also facilitate the propping-up within business group. 
Business groups often re-allocate funds to support financially distressed affiliates 
(Bae, Kang and Kim (2002); Mitton (2002); La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Zamarripa (2003)), e.g. controlling shareholders transfer funds from healthier firms 
(or use private resources) to prevent distressed affiliated firms from bankruptcy. 
Therefore, controlling shareholders can maintain their private benefits of control, and 
expropriate corporate resources when these financially distressed affiliates turn 
profitable in the future (Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003)). As a result, 
controlling shareholders have strong incentives to engage in propping-up if their 
expected private benefits of control in the financially distressed firms outweigh the 
cost of corporate propping-up behaviors (Bae, Cheon and Kang (2008)).  
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Intra-group loans issued by listed firms to controlling shareholders have been 
prohibited by the Chinese regulatory authorities ever since Oct 2005 (Jiang, Lee and 
Yue (2010); also see the “Notice on the Suggestion by the CSRC on Enhancing the 
Quality of Listed Firms”). Thus, most intra-group loans are issued by listed firms 
(high-cash-flow-right firms) to their wholly/partially owned subsidiaries 
(low-cash-flow-right firms), which suffer less from the tunneling concerns of 
inter-corporate loans in the country.17 
Both the propping-up hypothesis and the efficient internal capital market 
hypothesis may hold for the credit relocation among affiliated firms of business 
groups. The efficient internal capital market proposes that firms with higher 
investment opportunities will receive more credit, while the propping-up hypothesis 
proposes that financially distressed firms will receive more credit. According to the 
efficient internal capital market hypothesis, controlling shareholders have proprietary 
information of affiliated firms, and thus can relocate financial resources from 
affiliated firms with low growth prospects to others with high growth prospects. The 
value-enhancing credit reallocation in the internal capital market can overcome the 
frictions in the external credit market, and increase the overall valuation of the 
business group. In contrast, corporate propping-up is mainly driven by controlling 
shareholders’ incentive to support the financially distressed affiliates, and thus is less 
correlated with affiliated firms’ growth prospect. Furthermore, the propping-up may 
increase the expropriation risk of the business group since controlling shareholders 
                                                 
17 Tunneling within a business group often involves moving resources from low- to high-cash-flow right 
firms, as a controlling shareholder can increase its wealth if more resources are in firms where he has 
high cash flow rights (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000); Friedman, Johnson 
and Mitton (2003); La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Zamarripa (2003); Baek, Kang and Lee (2006); Bae, 
2008 #3476}). 
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anticipate extracting more private benefits from these loan receiving firms in good 
times in the future. 
The inter-corporate loans announced by affiliated firms provide us a unique 
setting to test these two competing hypothesis. If the internal capital market of a 
business group is efficient, the receipt of intra-group loans resembles traditional bank 
loans as the lenders have proprietary information of the borrowers. We expect that the 
announcements for the receipt of intra-group loans will lead to significantly positive 
excess returns on the stocks of the receiving firms. In particular, we expect the 
positive market reactions to be more pronounced for the receiving firms with higher 
investment opportunities. The issuance of intra-group loans, in particular those to 
subsidiaries, may lead to significantly positive excess returns on the stock of the 
issuing firms if the resource re-allocation increases the valuation of the whole 
business group. If the propping-up hypothesis holds, the receipt of intra-group loans 
will increase the valuation of affiliated firms as it conveys to uninformed investors a 
credible commitment of propping-up, which can benefit the minority shareholders of 
the receiving firms. However, the market reactions should be less correlated with 
borrowers’ growth prospects as the propping-up is mainly driven by the incentive to 
support financially distressed affiliates. Furthermore, the propping-up may reveal to 
the uninformed investors an increased expropriation risk in the business group, i.e., 
controlling shareholders contribute resources in crisis times and expropriate corporate 
resources in good times. We expect that the announcements for the issuance of 
intra-group loans will lead to significantly negative excess returns on the stock of 
issuing firms, in particular for those loans extended to their subsidiaries. 
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There are also fundamental differences of economic consequences from the two 
competing hypotheses. If the internal capital market is efficient, receiving firms 
employ the abundant credit of lending firms to increase their investments and improve 
corporate performance, while this value-enhancing credit re-allocation can also 
benefit the whole business group. Thus, if lenders extend loans to their subsidiaries, 
we propose an increase in both the investment and corporate performance in the 
receiving firms. In contrast, if the propping-up hypothesis holds, it may not lead to an 
increase in investment or performance after receiving intra-group loans. However, 
intra-group loans can still alleviate the financial burden of the receiving firms, thus 
may alleviate the deterioration in corporate performance. Moreover, corporate 
propping-up usually relocates funds from better performing firms to others with worse 
performance, thus conveying a signal of credit misallocation and potential tunneling 
risks when issuing intra-group loans to subsidiaries. Thus, we propose that firms 
issuing intra-group loans will have lower investment and consequently corporate 
performance deteriorates.  
 
4. Data and variables 
Our sample consists of non-financial firms traded on the Chinese stock market 
(both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange). We firstly identify a sample of 1,024 
announcements of inter-corporate loans during 2005-2012 from Resset 
(www.resset.cn), which is a widely used database for the Chinese stock market 
(Calomiris, Fisman and Wang (2010)). The CSRC requires all listed firms to 
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announce major events which may influence their stock prices.18 We then crosscheck 
the announcements with the official documents of corporate announcements 
published on the websites designated by the CSRC,19 and the websites of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Thus, we identify another 249 
announcements of inter-corporate loans. So we reach a sample of 1,273 
announcements of inter-corporate loans. Appendix 3 shows an example of an 
inter-corporate loan announcement record (translated by the authors). 
We exclude all observations that coincide with other confounding corporate 
events (i.e., release of annual reports, announcement of seasonal offerings, dividend, 
law suits, etc.) within the [-2, 2] trading day window around the announcements date 
of an inter-corporate loan. We obtain a sample of 719 unaffected announcements of 
issuance and receipt of inter-corporate loans. Appendix 4 tabulates the total volume of 
inter-corporate loans by all listed firms on Shanghai Stock Exchange, which shows 
that our sample covers a quarter of the total volume of inter-corporate loans. 
We record the announcement date, loan type (i.e., issuance / receipt), existing 
relationship between lender and borrower (i.e., inter-group and intra-group, where the 
                                                 
18 According to Article 67 of Chapter 3 of the Securities Law of China (effective as of Oct 27, 2005), the 
term “major event” means: (1) A major change in the company’s business guidelines or scope of business; 
(2) A decision made by the company concerning a major investment or major asset purchase; (3) 
Conclusion by the company of an important contract which may have an important effect on the 
company’s assets, liabilities, rights, interests or business results; (4) Incurrence by the company of a 
major debt or default on an overdue major debt; (5) Incurrence by the company of a major deficit or 
incurrence of a major loss; (6) A major change in the external conditions of the company’s production or 
business; (7) A change in the board of directors, no less than one-third of directors, supervisors or 
managers of the company; (8) A considerable change in the holdings of shareholders who hold no less 
than five percent of the company’s shares; (9) A decision made by the company to reduce its capital, to 
merge, to divide, to dissolve, or to apply for bankruptcy; (10) Major litigation involving the company, or 
lawful cancellation by a court of a resolution adopted by the shareholders’ general meeting or the board 
of directors; (11) Criminal cases involving the company, and the arrest of board of directors, supervisors 
or senior management staff; (12) Other events specified by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
19  The official designated websites for corporate disclosures are www.cninfo.com.cn and 
www.cnstock.com. 
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latter is further broken down into controlling shareholders, subsidiaries, and firms 
with other relationships, e.g., firms affiliated with the same business group but 
without equity ownership of each other), and ownership of the counter-party. In 
addition, we also record whether an inter-corporate loan is a new loan 
(issuance/receipt) or a loan revision. A new loan indicates that the borrower and 
lender do not have a prior inter-corporate loan between them, while a loan revision 
means there is an existing loan. The announcement files for inter-corporate loans 
enable us to identify loan terms such as the loan amount, interest rate, maturity, and 
collateral, and also the name of the financial institution involved, among other 
characteristics. 
The inter-corporate loan announcements are matched with stock prices and a set 
of firm characteristics at the fiscal year-end before the announcement year. We collect 
financial information for non-listed firms from the announcement files of 
inter-corporate loans, and also from the survey of industrial firms by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China. 20  As a result, we can compile a set of firm 
characteristics which may be associated with the CARs on announcements of 
inter-corporate loans. 
We include loan variables in the regression (loan size, interest rate, maturity, 
guarantee, and loan revision), as well as counter-party variables (intra-group and 
inter-group counter-party, counter-party industry, counter-party size, and state-owned 
counter-party). In addition, we include a set of firm variables: Size, age, 
market-to-book ratio, free cash flow, leverage, state-control, other accounts 
                                                 
20 We use the dataset for industrial firms in China, which include all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
all non-state owned firms with annual sales revenues above five million RMB, from 1998-2009. 
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receivable,21 and other accounts payable. Finally, we include industry and year fixed 
effects in the regression. Variable definitions are listed in Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Summary statistics 
We focus on 2005-2012 as our sample covers all announcements of 
inter-corporate loans in that period. Panel A of Table 2 shows the distribution of 719 
“clean” announcements by type and year. A total of 564 announcements were made on 
the issuance of inter-corporate loans, and 155 announcements on their receipts. The 
number of announcements increases over the years, with a slight decrease in 2012, 
and there are more announcements of issuances than of receipts. 
[Table 2 here] 
Panel B of Table 2 shows the distribution of inter-corporate loan announcements 
by industry. A majority of the inter-corporate loans are in the manufacturing industry. 
The utilities industry ranks second in the number of issuance announcements of 
                                                 
21 Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises of China (CAS) formulates the basic and specific 
standards for accounting information of financial reports. CAS, however, doesn’t specify the accounting 
method for the book-keeping of entrusted loans. Entrusted loans can be reported in accounting entries of 
other accounting receivables, other liquid assets, held-to-maturity investment or disbursement of loans 
and advances in a firm’s balance sheet. The interest revenues from issuing entrusted loans is reported in 
accounting entries of interest income, other business income, investment income or financial costs in a 
firm’s income statement. For example, the 2009 annual report of the Sunny Loan Top (stock ID: 600830) 
discloses the firm’s entrusted loans outstanding in the accounting entry of disbursement of loans and 
advances, while the revenue of entrusted loans appears in interest income. The 2011 annual report of 
China Coal Energy Company Ltd (stock ID: 601898) discloses the firm’s entrusted loans in other 
accounts receivables, while it doesn’t report the revenue from entrusted loans. 
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inter-corporate loans, whereas the real estate industry ranks second for receipt 
announcements. 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the characteristics of inter-corporate loans for issuance 
versus receipts as well as for intra-group versus inter-group loans. A majority of the 
announced inter-corporate loans are intra-group loans, on both issuance and receipts. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows a further decomposition of the intra-group loans into 
controlling shareholders, subsidiaries, and firms with other relationships. All 
issuances of intra-group loans go to the subsidiaries of listed firms except for four 
loans to the controlling shareholders, while a majority of the receipts of intra-group 
loans comes from the controlling shareholders. Table 3 also shows that issuance size 
is smaller than the receipt size for inter-corporate loans, the respective average loan 
sizes for issuance and receipt of inter-corporate loans being 185 and 300 (217 and 298 
for intra-group loans) million RMB. 
[Table 3 here] 
Table 3 also shows that the maturity is 18 months on average for the issuance of 
intra-group loans and 12 months for the issuance of inter-group loans. The maturity 
for the receipt of intra-group loans is slightly longer than that for inter-group loans. In 
addition, the average interest rate spread is 14 versus 115 percent over the basis 
lending rate for the issuance of intra-group versus inter-group loans; and 4 versus 17 
percent for the receipt of intra-group versus inter-group loans. Furthermore, the 
issuance of intra-group loans has a lower proportion of guarantees than inter-group 
loans (i.e., 13 versus 66 percent), which also applies to the receipt of intra-group 
versus inter-group loans (i.e., 9 versus 40 percent). 
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5.2 Determinants of issuing and receiving inter-corporate loans 
In order to identify factors that may affect the likelihood of issuing or receiving 
inter-corporate loans, we use the size-based matching method in Beasley (1996) and 
Bailey, Huang and Yang (2011). It allows us to identify a group of control firms with 
similar size and same industry. The dependent variable equals 1 for each firm-year in 
our sample, and 0 for a matching sample constructed for each firm-year from all firms 
that do not have any record on issuing or receiving inter-corporate loans in the sample 
period. Specifically, for each firm-year in our loan announcement sample, we identify 
all other firms from the same industry and choose the one with the closest value of 
total assets, as long as it is within the ten percent band of the sample firms’ total assets. 
We then pool these matched firms with our sample firms, and run a regression of the 
likelihood of issuing or receiving inter-corporate loans on a set of firm characteristics. 
Models (1)-(3) of Table 4 show that more mature firms are more likely to issue 
inter-group loans, while this is less likely the case for intra-group loans. In addition, 
firms with a higher market to book ratio are less likely to issue inter-group loans, 
while this ratio does not matter for the issuance of intra-group loans. Furthermore, 
firms with higher leverage are less likely to issue inter-group loans, while it does not 
matter for the issuance of intra-group loans. Besides, state-controlled firms are more 
likely to issue intra-group loans, while this is not the case for inter-group loans. And, 
firms with a CEO who is also a chairman of the board of directors are less likely to 
issue intra-group loans, which reflects the relative bargaining power in terms of credit 
re-allocation between the headquarter CEO and divisional CEO of a business group. 
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[Table 4 here] 
Models (4)-(6) of Table 4 show that more mature firms are less likely to receive 
inter-group loans. Also, firms with higher market to book ratio are more likely to 
receive inter-group loans, while market-to-book does not matter for the receipt of 
intra-group loans. In addition, firms with higher leverage are less likely to issue 
inter-group loans but more likely to receive inter-group loans. Furthermore, 
state-controlled firms are more likely to issue and receive intra-group loans, while not 
so for inter-group loans. Firms with higher profitability, however, are less likely to 
receive inter-group loans, which may reflect abundant cash flow in the firm thus a 
lower external credit demand. 
 
5.3 Market reactions to the issuance of inter-corporate loans 
A standard market model (as in Thompson (1985)) is used to estimate the 
benchmark returns and then to calculate the abnormal returns. In order to measure 
market returns, we use the equally-weighted market return for the Chinese stock 
market (A-shares) from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database. We define the announcement date as the event date (i.e., “day 0”). For each 
“clean” announcement of entrusted loans, we run a daily market model for the firms 
over the estimation window of [-250, -21], and calculate abnormal returns in the event 
windows accordingly. 
Since December 16, 1996, the Chinese government has imposed restrictions on 
the ceiling and floor of the daily stock price. Based on previous trading day’s closing 
price, the ceiling and floor for the stock prices are set at ten percent for all stocks and 
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five percent for stocks that are labeled as special treatment (“ST”) status.22 Thus, the 
stock price may continue to react after the announcement day, which makes CAR[-1, 
+1] an informative measure to capture a full market reaction besides the standard 
CAR[-1,0]. We also report results for various event windows (e.g., CAR[-2,+2]) to 
check the robustness of our findings. 
The top panel of Table 5 shows the abnormal returns on the issuance of 
inter-corporate loans. The two-day cumulative abnormal return, i.e., CAR[-1,0], is 
-0.42 percent and statistically significant at the one percent level in a Student’s t-test 
and significant at the one percent level in a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (i.e., the 
proportion of positive CARs is less than 50 percent). The results for AR[0] and 
CAR[-1,1] are qualitatively similar. The upper panel of Appendix 5 shows the average 
abnormal returns for the issuance of inter-corporate loans in the [-20, 20] window, 
which exhibits a substantial drop in the average abnormal return on the event day. 
[Table 5 here] 
As multiple inter-corporate loan issuances may be announced on a single day, we 
split the sample into single-event versus multiple-events subsamples in order to get a 
cleaner effect. Thus, the middle panel of Table 5 shows that the CAR[-1,0] is -0.48 
percent and statistically significant at the one percent level for the single-event 
subsample in both the t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test, and -0.17 percent and 
                                                 
22 According to CSRC, a company can be downgraded to ST status if: (1) The firm records a net loss in 
two consecutive fiscal years; (2) The company is found to have committed financial fraud and, after 
taking remedial action, records a net loss in two consecutive fiscal years; (3) The company is found to 
have committed financial fraud, the company has failed to take remedial action within a specified period 
after being urged by the CSRC to do so, and the company has been temporarily delisted for two months; 
(4) The company has failed to issue its annual report or semi-annual report on the designated date and has 
been temporarily delisted for two months. Any company that fails to take steps to improve its situation 
after being designated ST will ultimately be delisted from the stock exchange. 
 33 
 
insignificant for the multiple-events subsample. We will focus on the single-event 
subsample for the issuance of inter-corporate loans hereafter. 
Table 6 shows the issuance of inter-corporate loans by intra-group versus 
inter-group loans. The CAR[-1,0] for the issuance of intra-group loans is -0.62 percent 
and significant at the one percent level in both a t-test and a Wilcoxon singed-rank test, 
while it is -0.25 percent for inter-group loans and significant at one percent level in a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test although statistically insignificant in a t-test. Furthermore, 
the results for AR[0] and CAR[-1,-1] are qualitatively similar. 
In sum, the issuance of inter-corporate loans generates a negative market reaction, 
sending unfavorable signals to uninformed investors for both intra-group and 
inter-group loans. The issuance of inter-corporate loans may reveal a credit 
misallocation in a listed firm, e.g., a listed firm may run out of worthwhile projects to 
finance even when the inter-corporate loans may enhance the credit allocation. 
[Table 6 here] 
We also show the CARs separated into issuance of intra-group loans to 
controlling shareholders, subsidiaries, and borrowers with other relationships. Table 7 
shows that the issuance of intra-group loans to subsidiaries constitutes a majority of 
the sample, while the set of loans issued to controlling shareholders contains only four 
observations due to government sanctions since 2006. Consistent with the tunneling 
of intra-group loans to controlling shareholders in Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010), the 
CAR[-1,0] equals -1.97 percent, though it is not statistically significant due to the 
limited number of observations. In addition, CAR[-1,0] is -0.65 percent for the 
issuance of intra-group loans to subsidiaries, which is significant at the one percent 
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level in both a t-test and a Wilcoxon signed-test. We do not find any significant CARs 
for the issuance of intra-group loans to borrowers with other relationships. 
[Table 7] 
Besides indicating a lack of worthwhile projects in the issuing firm, the issuance 
of intra-group loans to subsidiaries may also reveal financial distress in this subsidiary, 
which may spill over to the rest of the business group. Our results provide evidence 
consistent with the role of ICMs in supporting financially weaker firms in a business 
group (Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007); Almeida, Kim and Kim (2015)). 
In sum, the negative CARs for the issuance of inter-group loans may reveal a 
credit misallocation to the uninformed investors, or rather a lack of worthwhile 
projects to finance for the issuing firms, even when such loans would improve credit 
allocation. The negative CARs for the issuance of inter-group loans indicate that high 
interest revenues from these loans do not fully off-set the deteriorating performance 
due to a lack of worthy projects in the issuing firms. Furthermore, the negative CARs 
for the issuance of intra-group loans to subsidiaries may reveal financial distress in 
the subsidiary which may spill over to the rest of the business group. Besides, the 
negative CARs for the issuance of intra-group loans to subsidiaries also suggest a 
propping-up by the listed firms, thus supporting the efficient internal capital market 
hypothesis. 
 
5.4 Market reactions to the receipt of inter-corporate loans 
Table 8 shows the abnormal returns for the receipt of inter-corporate loans. The 
CAR[-1,0] is 0.91 percent and statistically significant at the one percent level in a 
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t-test, and also at the ten percent level in a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. In addition, 
CAR[-1,0] is 1.09 percent and statistically significant at the one percent level in a 
t-test and at the five percent level for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the receipt of 
inter-corporate loans in the single-event subsample, and -0.59 percent in the 
multiple-events subsample (but not significant). Similarly, we will focus on the 
single-event subsample for the receipt of inter-corporate loans hereafter. The results 
are qualitatively similar for other event windows, such as AR[0], CAR[-1,1], and 
CAR[-2,2]. The lower panel of Appendix 5 shows a substantial jump upward in the 
average abnormal return on the event day of the receipt of inter-corporate loans. In 
sum, the receipt of inter-corporate loans has a certification effect for the borrowing 
firms in China, as do traditional bank loans in the U.S. 
[Table 8 here] 
We further tabulate the receipts of inter-corporate loans by intra-group versus 
inter-group loans. The top panel of Table 9 shows that the CAR[-1,0] for the receipt of 
intra-group loans is 1.06 percent and statistically significant at the one percent level in 
a t-test and also at the five percent level in a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The CAR[-1,0] 
is 1.33 percent for inter-group loans (but not statistically significant). The results are 
qualitatively similar for other event windows, e.g., AR[0], CAR[-1,1], and CAR[-2,2]. 
We find that the intra-group loans also have a certification effect for the borrowing 
firms, which may be due to their proprietary information due to affiliation with the 
same business group. 
[Table 9 here] 
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We also tabulate the receipts of intra-group loans by those from controlling 
shareholders, subsidiaries, and lenders with other relationships. Table 10 shows that 
intra-group loans from controlling shareholders constitute a majority of the sample. 
The CAR[-1,0] is 1.42 percent for the receipt of intra-group loans from controlling 
shareholders and is statistically significant at the one percent level in both a t-test and 
a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The positive CARs of the receipts of intra-group loans 
from controlling shareholders also suggest corporate propping-up activities, which 
may benefit the loan receiving firms but bring a wealth loss to the whole business 
group (i.e., inefficient internal capital market hypothesis). Furthermore, the receipt of 
intra-group loans from lenders with other relationship has a CAR[-1,0] of 0.37 percent 
(but not statistically significant). However, we do not find any clear evidence for the 
receipt of intra-group loans from subsidiaries, likely due to the limited number of 
observations. 
[Table 10 here] 
In sum, the receipt of inter-group loans may provide certification for the 
borrowing firms as traditional bank loans. However, the receipt of loans from 
controlling shareholders can provide a creditable commitment of corporate 
propping-up, which also leads to positive CARs to the stock of receiving firms. Our 
results are consistent with the literature on corporate propping-up by controlling 
shareholders in emerging markets (Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003); Jian and 
Wong (2010); Peng, Wei and Yang (2011)). 
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6. CARs and loan, counter-party and firm characteristics 
We link the CARs with loan, counter-party, and firm level variables. Firstly, we 
include loan variables, i.e., loan size, spread of the interest rate over basis lending rate, 
maturity, guarantee status (whether a loan is collateralized or guaranteed by 
third-parties), loan revision (whether a loan announcement relates to a revision of loan 
terms such as extension of maturities). We also include a set of counter-party variables, 
i.e., intra-group versus inter-group loans, whether the counter-party and the listed firm 
are in the same industry, counter-party size, and whether the counter-party is 
state-owned, etc. Finally, we include a set of firm level variables, i.e., firm size, age, 
market-to-book ratio, free cash flow, leverage, state control, other accounts receivable, 
and other accounts payable, etc. The balance of the issuance of inter-corporate loans is 
typically recorded in other accounts receivable, and while their receipt is often 
recorded in other accounts payable. Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010) show that other 
accounts receivable captures the tunneling activities of controlling shareholders. 
Because this channel has been closed since 2006, only four inter-corporate loans were 
issued to controlling shareholders. We include other accounts receivable and payable 
to measure the balance of inter-corporate loans outstanding at the fiscal year-end 
before these announcements. 
Appendix 6 shows summary statistics for the variables in the regression. Firms 
announcing the issuances of inter-corporate loans are more likely to be larger, more 
mature, state-controlled, and to have lower market to book ratio, lower leverage ratio, 
and lower other accounts receivable (i.e., lower inter-corporate loan issuances in the 
past) than those without any inter-corporate loan announcement. However, firms 
issuing inter-corporate loans are more likely to have lower free cash flow, which 
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shows that the issuing firms may not simply relocate abundant cash for higher 
investment returns, e.g., rescuing group firms even though the list firm does not have 
abundant cash. In contrast, firms announcing the receipt of inter-corporate loans are 
more likely to be larger, more mature, state-controlled, and have higher leverage ratio, 
and higher other accounts payable (i.e., higher inter-corporate loans receipts in the 
past). 
Table 11 shows the regressions of CAR[-1,0] for the issuance and receipt of 
inter-corporate loans on the loan, counter-party and firm characteristics. Models (1) to 
(4) give the estimates for the issuance, and Models (5) to (8) for the receipt of 
inter-corporate loans. Model (1) of Table 11 shows that the CARs on the issuance of 
inter-corporate loans are negatively associated with the interest rate spread over the 
basis lending rate. Model (2) shows that CARs on the issuance of inter-corporate 
loans are lower for intra-group loans, which may be due to a signaling effect as to the 
financial distress of a group firm, and inefficient internal capital market through 
corporate propping-up. Specifically, intra-group loans to subsidiaries at a higher 
interest rate may reveal a high default risk in these subsidiaries, which could spill over 
to the rest of the business group. 
[Table 11 here] 
Model (3) of Table 11 shows that more mature firms in the stock market generate 
higher CARs on the issuance of inter-corporate loans, as uninformed investors may 
already know their low growth potential, and also be less concerned about default 
risks for the borrowing subsidiaries. Furthermore, Model (4) shows that firms with 
higher market-to-book ratios have lower CARs due to more severe credit 
misallocation in the fast-growing issuing firms. In other words, an issuance of an 
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inter-corporate loan by a firm with higher growth prospects may provide more 
valuable proprietary information to the uninformed investors on a lack of worthwhile 
projects to finance in the issuing firm. Finally, the CARs are lower for issuers with 
higher other accounts receivable, i.e., the issuing firms already have substantial 
issuances of inter-corporate loans outstanding, which may further confirm credit 
misallocation in the issuing firm and financial distress in a group firm, and further 
aggravates the corporate propping-up concerns. 
Model (5) of Table 11 shows the regression results for CARs on the receipt of 
inter-corporate loans on loan variables, with no variables being statistically significant. 
The CARs are lower for loans with higher interest rate spreads, and these are 
significant at the ten percent level when we control for counter-party variables in 
Model (6), and further the firm characteristics in Model (8). A wider interest rate 
spread shows a higher default risk in the borrowing firm, which may attenuate the 
certification effect for these non-financial corporate lenders. However, there is no 
difference between intra-group and inter-group lenders for the market reactions to the 
receipt of inter-corporate loans. 
State-owned lenders are associated with lower CARs in Model (8), which is 
significant at the five percent level and shows that these state-owned lenders are less 
credit-worthy in terms of certification for the borrowing firms. In contrast, state 
controlled firms are associated with higher CARs when receiving inter-corporate 
loans. State controlled firms are often worse in terms of performance, and 
inter-corporate loans may have a larger certification effect for such borrowing firms. 
Other accounts payable, however, is insignificant though the sign is positive in Model 
(8) of Table 11. Our results are generally consistent with the bank loan announcement 
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literature in that certification is more effective if given by more credit-worthy lenders 
(Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995)), and also more effective for poorly 
performing borrowers (Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers (2006)). 
In sum, we find that the CARs on issuance and receipt of inter-corporate loans 
are associated with various loan, counter-party, and (loan-announcing) firm variables. 
On the one hand, the issuance of inter-corporate loans generates lower CARs for loans 
with wider interest rate spreads, for intra-group loans, for firms with a higher 
market-to-book ratios, and with higher other accounts receivable (i.e., higher 
issuances of inter-corporate loans outstanding). On the other hand, the receipt of 
inter-corporate loans generates lower CARs for the loans with a higher interest rate 
spread, loans from state-owned lenders, and loans to non-state controlled borrowers. 
The results support the hypothesis that the issuance of inter-corporate loans signals to 
uninformed investors a lack of worthwhile projects to finance in the issuing firms, 
while the issuance of intra-group loans conveys additional information of financial 
distress in a group firm, and also the inefficient internal capital market in terms of 
corporate propping-up. 
 
7. Corporate investment and performance in the long-run 
In addition, we examine the economic consequence (changes in investment and 
performance) of inter-corporate loans for both issuing and receiving firms as it 
reflects how the credit is allocated across firms ex post. On the one hand, if the 
positive market reaction to the receipt of inter-group loans indicates a certification, 
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this capital relocation can alleviate financial restrictions and enable the receiving 
firms to invest more than the issuing firms. On the other hand, the issuance of 
intra-group loans conveys additional information about the inefficient internal capital 
market in terms of corporate propping-up. The investment of the receiving firms ex 
post the intra-group loans should be irreverent with their investment opportunities. 
We explore the changes of capital expenditures scaled by the total assets in the 
years around the loan announcements for both the issuing and receiving firms. Table 
12 shows the changes of capital expenditures in the years around the issuance of 
inter-corporate loans scaled by the total asset in the year before the loan 
announcements. We find that the capital expenditure decreases for the issuing firms 
with high market to book ratio while insignificant for the receiving firms (both the 
intra-group and inter-group loans). In particular, the difference between firms issuing 
inter-group loans with high versus low market to book ratio is significant at the one 
percent level. However, we do not find any significant difference between firms 
issuing intra-group loans and with high versus low market to book ratio. Put 
differently, firms issuing inter-corporate loans indeed invest less ex post especially for 
firms with high market to book ratio, which confirms a lack of investment 
opportunities in the issuers. The intra-group loans, however, may be used as a channel 
for corporate propping up, which endangers the investment behaviors of both the 
issuers and receivers of intra-group loans. 
 [Table 12 here] 
The changes in the performance ex post the inter-corporate loans can also cast 
light on their long-term wealth effect. We examine firms’ accounting performance 
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after the inter-corporate loan announcements. If the issuance of inter-corporate loans 
reveals credit misallocation in the issuing firms (i.e., inter-group loan) or financial 
distress in a subsidiary (i.e., intra-group loan), we would expect the accounting 
performance to turn worse ex post. In contrast, if the receipt of inter-corporate loans 
provides certification for the receiving firms (inter-group loan) or corporate 
propping-up (intra-group loan, i.e. less financial burdens), we would expect a higher 
accounting performance ex post. Table 13 shows the return on assets (ROA) in the 
years before and after inter-corporate loan announcements. 
[Table 13 here] 
In addition, we find that ROA decreases significantly from one year before to 
two years after inter-corporate loan announcements for firms issuing both intra-group 
and inter-group loans, and with relatively higher market to book ratio but not for firms 
with a lower market to book ratio. A t-test between the two groups of firms shows that 
ROA decreases more for firms with high market to book ratio, which are significant at 
the ten and five percent level for intra-group and inter-group loans respectively. Firms 
with higher growth potential indeed perform worse after the issuance of 
inter-corporate loans, which is consistent with a revelation for a lack of worthwhile 
projects to finance in the issuing firms, and a misallocation of credit from 
high-growing firms to others. Firms with lower growth potential, however, can benefit 
from the high interest revenue of the inter-group loans, which can alleviate the 
performance deterioration. Besides, the issuance of intra-group loans may also reveal 
the corporate propping up and the default risks within the business group. The results 
are qualitatively similar when we look at the change from one year before and one 
year afterwards, and from the announcement year to two years afterwards. 
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We find that ROA increases (though insignificant) from the announcement year 
to two years after the receipt of (i.e., low interest rate) intra-group loans in Table 13, 
which reduces the financial burdens of the receiving firms. In contrast, the 
performance of the firms receiving inter-group loans deteriorates (though insignificant) 
in Table 13, which may be caused by the higher interest burdens of these loans. 
However, there is no significant difference between the receiving firms with high 
versus low market to book ratio, or intra-group versus inter-group loans. 
 
8. Conclusion 
The granting of entrusted loans in China provides us with a unique setting to 
assess the valuation effects of inter-corporate lending and borrowing. We find that 
investors react negatively to the issuance of inter-corporate loans but positively to 
their receipt. The issuing of inter-corporate loans may indicate credit misallocation to 
uninformed investors, i.e., the issuing firms run out of worthy projects to finance. 
Furthermore, the issuance of inter-corporate loans to subsidiaries may reveal financial 
distress in that subsidiary, which may eventually spill over to the rest of the business 
group. 
On the other hand, the receipt of intra-group loans, especially those from 
controlling shareholders, provides certification for the borrowing firms. In contrast to 
bank loan announcements, which often provoke negative market reactions (Bailey, 
Huang and Yang (2011)), non-financial corporate lenders in China can convey 
proprietary information to the uninformed investors. 
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We also confirm our results by linking the CARs to loan, counter-party, and firm 
level variables. The issuance of inter-corporate loans generate lower CARs for the 
intra-group loans, for loans with higher interest rate spreads, and for loans granted by 
young issuers, with higher market-to-book ratios and larger outstanding issuances of 
inter-corporate loans. In contrast, the receipt of inter-corporate loans generates lower 
CARs on loans with higher interest rate spreads, on loans from state-owned lenders, 
and on loans to non-state-controlled borrowers. Our results shed light on 
inter-corporate loans as signaling devices for credit misallocation by issuing firms, 
and for financial distress in a borrowing subsidiary, which can spill over to the rest of 
the business group. 
We further examine the ex post consequences on the investment and performance 
by these inter-corporate loans. On the one hand, firms with high growth potential that 
issue inter-corporate loans cut down their corporate investment, while the receiving 
firms of intra-group loans do not increase their corporate investment, which suggests 
a credit misallocation in the internal capital market within the business group. On the 
other hand, firms with higher growth potential that issue inter-corporate loans have a 
worse performance, which confirms a lack of worthwhile projects to finance. Firms 
with lower growth potential that issue inter-group loans, however, can alleviate the 
deterioration of the performance through the high interest revenue from these loans. 
Firms receiving intra-group / inter-group loans do not have better performance, which 
may be caused by the corporate propping-up for the former and a high interest burden 
by these loans for the latter. 
Although inter-corporate loans play an increasingly important role in China, we 
still know little about the welfare gains from these loans. Because inter-corporate 
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loans rarely arise between listed firms, we cannot calculate the net gains from such 
loans. Further research on the net gains from inter-corporate loans would provide 
more insight on whether or not such loans should be encouraged. 
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Variable 
category Variable name Definition
Loan size The amount of inter-corporate loan, in millions of RMB
Spread The annual interest rate on the inter-corporate loan over the
basis lending rate minus one, i.e., the interest premium over
the basis lending rate
Maturity The maturity of the inter-corporate loan, in months
Guarantee =1 if the loan is collateralized or guaranteed by a third-party,
0 otherwise
Loan revision =1 if the loan terms are revised, 0 otherwise
Intra-group loan =1 if the counter-party firm is a loan-announcing firm’s
subsidiary, controlling shareholder, or belongs to the same
business group
Counter-party 
ownership
A loan-announcing firm’s equity ownership in the counter-
party firm, or the controlling shareholder’s equity ownership
in a loan-announcing firm
Counter-party 
industry
=1 if the industry of the counter-party firm is the same as the
loan-announcing firm, 0 otherwise
Counter-party size The logarithm of the total assets of the counter-party firm
State-owned counter-
party
=1 if the counter-party firm is state-owned, 0 otherwise
Firm size The logarithm of total assets
Sales growth The annual sales` growth rate
Market to book ratio The ratio of the market value over the book value of assets
Cash holding Cash over total assets
Free cash flow Operating cash flow minus capital expenditure over total
assets
Leverage Total liabilities over total assets
State control =1 if the ultimate owner is the state, 0 otherwise
Other accounts 
receivable
Other accounts receivable over total assets
Other accounts 
payable
Other accounts payable over total assets
Loan
Counter-party 
Firm
(Loan-
announcing) 
Firm
Table 1: Definitions of variables.
Year All Issuance Receipt
2005 15 11 4
2006 26 18 8
2007 39 31 8
2008 91 74 17
2009 93 73 20
2010 123 90 33
2011 180 133 47
2012 152 134 18
Total 719 564 155
Industry names All Issuance Receipt
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and
fishery 9 9 0
Mining 43 41 2
Manufacturing 337 264 73
Utilities 67 55 12
Construction 10 7 3
Transportation 29 22 7
Information technology 28 26 2
Wholesale and retail trade 51 48 3
Real estate 76 35 41
Social service 46 42 4
Communication and culture 5 5 0
Comprehensive 18 10 8
Total 719 564 155
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on the announcement of inter-corporate loans.
Panel A: Distribution of inter-corporate loan announcements by year and type
Panel B: Distribution of inter-corporate loan announcements by industry
Test of mean difference
# Obs. Mean Median # Obs. Mean Median T-stat
Loan size 564 185.23 70 155 300.26 180 -2.59***
Maturity 500 16.29 12 146 18.99 12 -2.14**
Spread 452 0.45 0.06 143 0.05 0 6.24***
Guarantee 564 0.29 0 155 0.12 0 4.19***
Loan revision 564 0.11 0 155 0.10 0 0.47
Loan size 396 216.57 80 140 298.28 150 -1.50
Maturity 339 18.22 12 134 19.07 12 -0.57
Spread 312 0.14 0 132 0.04 0 2.44**
Guarantee 396 0.13 0 140 0.09 0 1.05
Loan revision 396 0.11 0 140 0.11 0 0.05
Loan size 168 111.36 60 15 318.80 200 -3.97***
Maturity 161 12.24 12 12 18.17 12 -2.44**
Spread 140 1.15 1.21 11 0.17 0 3.79***
Guarantee 168 0.66 1 15 0.40 0 2.03**
Loan revision 168 0.11 0 15 0 0 1.38
  Panel B: subsample of intra-group loans
Loan size 4 189.50 340 105 305.09 200 -0.55
Maturity 4 9.75 12 104 19.09 12 -1.19
Spread 4 0.12 0 102 0.01 0 0.79
Guarantee 4 0 0 105 0.10 0 -0.64
Loan revision 4 0 0 105 0.08 0 -0.57
Loan size 375 216.93 80 10 165.50 80 0.27
Maturity 324 18.51 12 9 12.67 12 1.20
Spread 294 0.12 0 8 0.18 0 -0.40
Guarantee 375 0.12 0 10 0 0 1.16
Loan revision 375 0.11 0 10 0 0 1.09
Loan size 16 225.25 60.10 25 322.80 100 -0.49
Maturity 10 12.60 12 21 21.71 12 -1.64*
Spread 13 0.40 0.10 22 0.11 0 1.26
Guarantee 16 0.31 0 25 0.12 0 1.52
Loan revision 16 0.19 0 25 0.28 0 -0.66
Table 3: Characteristics of inter-corporate loans.
Loan size is the amount of inter-corporate loans in millions of RMB; Maturity is the loan
maturity in numbers of months; Spread is the percentage increase in the interest rate from
the basis lending rate; Guarantee equals one if a loan is collateralized or guaranteed by a
third party, zero otherwise. Loan revision equals one if the loan terms are revised, zero
otherwise. The test of mean difference between issuance and receipt reports the t-statistics
with significance *** at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten percent level.
To borrowers/from lenders with other relationship
To/from subsidiaries
Issuance Receipt
To/from controlling shareholders
All loans
Intra-group loans
Inter-group loans
Panel A: all inter-corporate loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample Intra-group Inter-group Full sample Intra-group Inter-group
Firm age -0.01 -0.03** 0.03* -0.01 0.01 -0.19**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08)
Market to book ratio -0.07* -0.04 -0.12** 0.03 -0.01 0.55***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.18)
Leverage -1.03*** -0.48 -2.24*** 0.52 0.29 8.46*
(0.16) (0.32) (0.38) (0.67) (0.69) (4.98)
State control 0.37*** 0.53*** 0.13 0.34*** 0.38*** -0.23
(0.09) (0.15) (0.16) (0.11) (0.14) (1.05)
EBIT -0.59 -0.19 -1.44 0.77 1.19 -22.41*
(1.04) (1.18) (1.84) (2.07) (2.27) (11.64)
CEO also chairman -0.40*** -0.82*** 0.10 -0.30 -0.26 -1.25
(0.12) (0.32) (0.20) (0.21) (0.18) (0.81)
Constant 0.77*** 0.56* 1.05*** -0.26 -0.38 -1.91
(0.26) (0.31) (0.35) (0.56) (0.63) (2.19)
Observations 486 317 181 161 136 25
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.075 0.109 0.025 0.025 0.357
The dependent variable is loan issuance / receipt which equals 1 if a firm issues/receives an
inter-corporate loan, 0 otherwise. Firm age is the logarithm of the firm age; Market to book ratio
is market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities scaled by book value of total assets;
Leverage is total liabilities over total assets; State-control equals one if the ultimate controller of
the firm is state-owned, zero otherwise. CEO also chairman equals 1 if the CEO is also the
chairman of the board, 0 otherwise. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in
parentheses. Significance indicated as *** at one, ** at five, and * at ten percent level.
Issuance Receiving
Table 4: The determinants of issuance / receipt of inter-corporate loans. 
# Obs Mean Median T-stat Signed-rank test
AR[0] 440 -0.37 -0.26 -4.14*** 0.42***
CAR[-1,0] 440 -0.42 -0.41 -3.08*** 0.40***
CAR[-1,1] 440 -0.49 -0.56 -2.74*** 0.42***
CAR[-2,2] 440 -0.70 -0.59 -3.02*** 0.42***
AR[0] 350 -0.40 -0.31 -4.00*** 0.39***
CAR[-1,0] 350 -0.48 -0.56 -3.07*** 0.38***
CAR[-1,1] 350 -0.51 -0.66 -2.52** 0.41***
CAR[-2,2] 350 -0.67 -0.59 -2.53** 0.42***
AR[0] 90 -0.26 0.12 -1.28 0.54
CAR[-1,0] 90 -0.17 0.02 -0.65 0.50
CAR[-1,1] 90 -0.41 -0.26 -1.08 0.44
CAR[-2,2] 90 -0.81 -0.61 -1.72* 0.39*
All loans
Single event
Multiple-events
Inter-corporate loans are classified as single-events if there is a single
announcement for issuing a loan on the same date, and vice versa for multiple-
events. The t-test of the CARs reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test report the proportion of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as
*** at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten percent level.
Table 5: CARs on the issuance of inter-corporate loans.
# Obs Mean Median T-stat Signed-rank test
AR[0] 222 -0.44 -0.29 -3.71*** 0.41***
CAR[-1,0] 222 -0.62 -0.43 -3.32*** 0.39***
CAR[-1,1] 222 -0.58 -0.54 -2.44** 0.43***
CAR[-2,2] 222 -0.56 -0.47 -1.82* 0.44**
# Obs Mean Median T-stat Signed-rank test
AR[0] 128 -0.32 -0.48 -1.81* 0.35***
CAR[-1,0] 128 -0.25 -0.63 -0.88 0.36***
CAR[-1,1] 128 -0.37 -0.73 -1.03 0.38**
CAR[-2,2] 128 -0.86 -0.79 -1.75* 0.40**
Intra-group borrowers
Inter-group borrowers
Inter-corporate loans are in the intra-group borrowers subsample if the borrowers
are in the same business group, and vice versa for the inter-group borrowers
subsample. The t-test of the CARs reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test reports the proportion of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as ***
at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten percent level.
Table 6: CARs on the issuance for intra-group versus inter-group
borrowers.
# Obs Mean Median T-stat Signed-rank test
AR[0] 4 -0.61 -0.55 -1.28 0.25
CAR[-1,0] 4 -1.97 -0.83 -1.33 0.25
CAR[-1,1] 4 -1.42 -1.32 -1.15 0.50
CAR[-2,2] 4 -5.32 -4.13 -2.05 0.00*
# Obs Mean Median T-stat Signed-rank test
AR[0] 206 -0.45 -0.25 -3.64*** 0.42***
CAR[-1,0] 206 -0.65 -0.43 -3.35*** 0.38***
CAR[-1,1] 206 -0.63 -0.54 -2.48** 0.43***
CAR[-2,2] 206 -0.51 -0.47 -1.60 0.44**
# Obs Mean Median T-stat Signed-rank test
AR[0] 12 -0.17 -0.54 -0.35 -0.42
CAR[-1,0] 12 0.43 -0.32 0.67 0.50
CAR[-1,1] 12 0.44 -0.48 0.57 0.42
CAR[-2,2] 12 0.22 0.45 0.20 0.50
Intra-group loans to controlling shareholders
Intra-group loans to subsidiaries
Intra-group loans to borrowers with other relationships
Intra-group loans are in subsamples according to controlling shareholders,
subsidiaries, and borrowers with other relationships. The t-test of the CARs
reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test reports the proportion
of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as *** at one percent, ** at five
percent, and * at ten percent level.
Table 7: CARs on the issuance of intra-group loans to controlling
shareholders, subsidiaries, and borrowers with other relationships. 
# Obs Mean Median T-stat Signed-rank test
AR[0] 140 0.35 0.04 1.45 0.51
CAR[-1,0] 140 0.91 0.10 2.67*** 0.51*
CAR[-1,1] 140 1.01 0.49 2.55** 0.54*
CAR[-2,2] 140 0.9 0.51 2.14** 0.56*
AR[0] 125 0.46 0.18 1.74* 0.53
CAR[-1,0] 125 1.09 0.57 2.95*** 0.54**
CAR[-1,1] 125 1.31 0.84 3.04*** 0.58**
CAR[-2,2] 125 1.15 0.62 2.52** 0.60**
AR[0] 15 -0.58 -0.52 -2.14* 0.33*
CAR[-1,0] 15 -0.59 -1.34 -0.86 0.33
CAR[-1,1] 15 -1.45 -2.02 -1.97* 0.20**
CAR[-2,2] 15 -1.15 -2.36 -1.27 0.27
All loans
Single event
Multiple events
Inter-corporate loans are classed as single-events if there is a single
announcement of a loan receipt on the same date, and as multiple-events if
there are multiple announcements of loan receipts on the same date. The t-test
of the CARs reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test reports
the proportion of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as *** at one
percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten percent level.
Table 8: CARs on the receipt of inter-corporate loans. 
# Obs Mean Median T-stat Signed-rank test
AR[0] 110 0.43 0.18 1.69* 0.54
CAR[-1,0] 110 1.06 0.62 2.79*** 0.55**
CAR[-1,1] 110 1.19 0.81 2.76*** 0.59**
CAR[-2,2] 110 1.04 0.6 2.12** 0.58*
# Obs Mean Median T-stat Signed-rank test
AR[0] 15 0.68 -0.73 0.56 0.47
CAR[-1,0] 15 1.33 -0.03 0.97 0.40
CAR[-1,1] 15 2.16 1.42 1.26 0.53
CAR[-2,2] 15 1.93 1.75 1.56 0.73
Intra-group lenders
Inter-group lenders
Inter-corporate loans are in the intra-group lenders subsample if the lenders are in the same
business group, and as inter-group lenders if the lenders are not in the same business
group. The t-test of the CARs reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test
reports the proportion of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as *** at one percent, **
at five percent, and * at ten percent level.
Table 9: CARs on the receipt from intra-group versus inter-group lenders. 
# Obs Mean Median T-stat Signed-rank test
AR[0] 81 0.55 0.30 1.99* 0.58
CAR[-1,0] 81 1.42 0.72 3.07*** 0.58***
CAR[-1,1] 81 1.70 0.85 3.12*** 0.60***
CAR[-2,2] 81 1.54 1.15 2.53** 0.60**
# Obs Mean Median T-stat Signed-rank test
AR[0] 7 -0.6 -1.14 -1.13 0.29
CAR[-1,0] 7 -0.98 -1.35 -0.96 0.43
CAR[-1,1] 7 -1.15 -1.75 -0.93 0.43
CAR[-2,2] 7 -2.23 -1.96 -1.46 0.43
# Obs Mean Median T-stat Signed-rank test
AR[0] 22 0.28 -0.06 0.39 0.45
CAR[-1,0] 22 0.37 -0.08 0.51 0.50
CAR[-1,1] 22 0.04 0.72 0.07 0.59
CAR[-2,2] 22 0.28 0.34 0.33 0.55
Intra-group loans from controlling shareholders
Intra-group loans from subsidiaries
Intra-group loans from lenders with other relationship
Intra-group loans are in subsamples according to controlling shareholders,
subsidiaries, and borrowers with other relationship. The t-test of the CARs reports
the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test reports the proportion of positive
CARs. Significance is indicated as *** at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten 
percent level.
Table 10: CARs on the receipt of intra-group loans from controlling
shareholders, subsidiaries, and lenders with other relationship. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log loan size -0.10 -0.04 -0.21 -0.08 -0.52 0.01 0.40 1.16
(0.17) (0.23) (0.21) (0.26) (0.54) (0.65) (0.44) (1.15)
Spread -0.69** -0.90* -0.65* -1.10** -1.19 -5.44* -0.05 -11.42*
(0.30) (0.49) (0.37) (0.53) (1.81) (2.78) (2.16) (5.75)
Log maturity 0.24 0.04 0.33 0.00 -0.50 -0.40 -0.67 0.28
(0.35) (0.43) (0.40) (0.49) (0.93) (1.09) (0.95) (1.31)
Guarantee 0.62 0.72 0.84 0.95 -0.31 0.93 1.69 2.91
(0.43) (0.54) (0.53) (0.62) (1.47) (2.30) (1.31) (2.91)
Loan revision -0.64 -1.04 -0.62 -1.11 1.48 0.58 2.00 -1.10
(0.76) (0.90) (0.84) (0.92) (1.55) (1.48) (1.89) (2.35)
Intra-group loan -1.64** -1.74** -0.20 -0.09
(0.78) (0.84) (3.81) (6.09)
Counter-party industry 0.22 0.19 0.46 1.17
(0.57) (0.59) (1.35) (1.99)
Counter-party size -0.14 -0.23 0.20 -0.36
(0.14) (0.15) (0.35) (0.52)
State-owned counter-party 0.73 0.72 -1.86 -7.40**
(0.52) (0.62) (1.99) (3.28)
Firm size -0.01 -0.08 -0.55 -1.03
(0.26) (0.29) (0.78) (1.50)
Age 0.10** 0.10* -0.03 -0.30
(0.05) (0.06) (0.14) (0.32)
Market to book ratio -0.06 -0.42* 0.09 0.43
(0.24) (0.24) (0.65) (1.05)
Free cash flow -0.81 -1.58 -2.14 -9.27
(1.02) (1.37) (4.64) (7.30)
Leverage -0.46 -1.16 -6.09* -6.47
(1.58) (2.03) (3.38) (5.80)
State control 0.04 -0.19 1.04 9.04*
(0.50) (0.59) (1.44) (4.70)
Other accounts receivable -11.57** -14.49**
(5.83) (7.16)
Other accounts payable 4.19 7.07
(3.50) (8.65)
Constant 2.71 3.19 3.22 6.34 9.58 4.21 18.14 23.05
(1.85) (2.60) (5.51) (5.94) (6.49) (10.24) (16.64) (34.72)
Industry and year dummie Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 277 207 259 194 92 57 86 53
R-squared 0.117 0.192 0.141 0.234 0.301 0.429 0.499 0.668
Counter-party
(Loan-
announcing) 
Firm
The dependent variable is the CAR[-1,0] in percentage points. Log loan size is the logarithm of the amount of inter-corporate
loans in millions of RMB; Log maturity is the logarithm of the loan maturity in number of months; Spread is the percentage
increase in the interest rate from the basis lending rate; Guarantee equals one if a loan is collateralized or guaranteed by a third
party, zero otherwise; Loan revision equals one if a loan revises the previous loan terms, zero otherwise; Intra-group loan
equals one if the counter-party is in a same business group, zero otherwise; Counter-party industry equals one if the counter-
party and loan-announcing firm are in the same industry, zero otherwise; Counter-party size is the logarithm of total assets of
the counter-party; State-owned counter-party equals one if the counter-party is state-owned, zero otherwise; Firm size is the
logarithm of total assets; Age is the number of years listed in the stock exchanges; Market to book ratio is the market value of
equity plus the book value of total liabilities scaled by the book value of total assets; Free cash flow is the free cash flow over
total assets; Leverage is the total liabilities over total assets; State-control equals one if the ultimate controller of the firm is
state-owned, zero otherwise; Other accounts receivable is the other accounts receivable over total assets; Other accounts
payable is the other accounts payable over total assets. Industry and year dummies are included and the coefficients are omitted.
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance is indicated as *** at one percent, ** at five
percent, and * at ten percent level.
Table 11: The regression of CAR[-1,0] on loan, counter-party and firm characteristics. 
Issuance of inter-corporate loans Receipt of inter-corporate loans
Loan
Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev
CAPX[+1,+2] – CAPX[-1,0]
Intra-group loans -0.0285** 0.0111 -0.0039 0.0123
    High MB -0.0453** 0.0195 -0.0064 0.0223
    Low MB -0.0117 0.0107 -0.0014 0.0108
T-test of high MB vs low M -0.0336 0.0222 -0.0050 0.0247
Inter-group loans -0.0089 0.0059 0.1833 0.1991
    High MB -0.0245*** 0.0091 0.3456 0.3999
    Low MB 0.0067 0.0070 0.0210 0.0624
T-test of high MB vs low M -0.0312*** 0.0114 0.3246 0.4048
-0.0196 0.016 -0.1872** 0.0844
Table 12: Capital expenditure ex post  inter-corporate loan 
T-test of intra-group vs inter-group loans
Issue Receive
CAPX is capital expenditure scaled by the total assets in the year before loan
announcement. [-1] / [0] / [+1] / [+2] indicates the number of years before / after the
inter-corporate loan announcement. 160 / 84 observations are included for intra-
group / inter-group loans respectively for the issue, and 72 / 12 observations are
included for the receive. The t-test of the mean difference reports the t-statistic.
Significance is indicated as *** at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten
percent level. 
Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev
ROA[+2] – ROA[-1]
Intra-group loans -0.0174*** 0.0042 0.0099 0.0087
    High MB -0.0247*** 0.0055 0.0189 0.0154
    Low MB -0.0100 0.0062 0.0008 0.0083
T-test of high MB vs low M -0.0146* 0.0083 0.0181 0.0175
Inter-group loans -0.0082 0.0067 -0.0122 0.0101
    High MB -0.0235** 0.0107 -0.0165 0.0184
    Low MB 0.0071 0.0077 -0.0080 0.0100
T-test of high MB vs low M -0.0305** 0.0132 -0.0085 0.0210
-0.0091 0.0075 0.0221 0.0209
T-test of intra-group vs inter-group loans
Issue Receive
ROA is net income over total assets. [-1] / [+2] indicates the number of years before /
after the inter-corporate loan announcement. 168 / 92 observations are included for
intra-group / inter-group loans respectively for the issue, and 76 / 14 for the receive.
The t-test of the mean difference reports the t-statistic. Significance is indicated as ***
at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten percent level. 
Table 13: ROA ex post  inter-corporate loan announcements.
Appendix 
Date Type Name Note Institution
12/30/1992 Entrusted loan A reply to the ICBC on the issues of
entrusted loan
It clarifies several issues on entrusted loans correspondingly the
request of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
(ICBC), e.g. the definition of entrusted loans. 
PBC
5/16/1996 Litigation 
guidance
A reply to Sichuan People’s Higher Court
on the qualification of subjects in the
entrusted loan contracts
It specifies the rules for the subjects in the litigation cases on
entrusted loan contracts corresponding a request by the Sichuan 
People’s Higher Court .
PSC
8/1/1996 Entrusted loan General rules on loans It specifies detailed rules on entrusted loans. PBC
12/13/1997 Litigation 
guidance
Issues on the litigation cases on certificates
of deposit
It specifies several rules for the disputes in entrusted loan
contracts.
PSC
1/1/1998 Disclosure 
requirements
Regulations of IPO by Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchange
It specifies the disclosure requirement on entrusted loans, and
also related party transactions. It has been revised seven times,
and the latest version is effective from July 2012.
SSC and 
SZSE
4/1/1999 Interest rate 
lateralization
Interest rate regulations of RMB It specifies the regulations for the interest rate of deposits and
loans denominated in RMB.
PBC
4/5/2000 Entrusted loan Notice on the issues for entrusted loan by
commercial banks
It specifies a definition of entrusted loans, and switches the
approval system to the registration system for entrusted loans.
PBC
10/19/2005 Entrusted loans Notice on the CSRC suggestion on
enhancing the quality of listed firms
It prohibits the entrusted loans from the listed firms to the
controlling shareholders. 
SCC
10/27/2005 Disclosure 
requirements
China securities law It specifies the types of major events that should be
announcement timely in Article of 67 at Chapter 3, e.g.
entrusted loan. 
NPC
2/2/2007 Disclosure 
requirements
Explanatory notice on the regulations on
information disclosure of listed firms
It specifies the information disclosure of extraordinary items for
listed firms, e.g., entrusted loans.
CSRC
7/19/2013 Interest rate 
lateralization
Notice on the further reform for the
marketization of interest rate
It lifts the regulation on the floor of the lending interest rate,
and also the ceiling of the lending interest rate for rural credit
cooperatives. 
PBC
12/10/2013 Entrusted loan Notice on several issues of tightening the
regulation on shadow banking
It tightens the regulation for the shadow banking system
including entrusted loans
SCC
Abbreviations: NPC is the National People’s Council; PBC is People’s Bank of China; PSC is the People’s Supreme Court; SSC is the
Shanghai Stock Exchange; SZSC is the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. SCC is the State Council of China; CSRC is the China Securities
Regulatory Commission. 
Appendix 1: Timeline of laws and regulations related with entrusted loans.
Appendix 2: Market shares of financing sources in China. 
The upper panel shows the proportion of inter-corporate loan over total
financing (left-axis, in percentage points) and the trend of total financing
(right axis, in trillions of RMB), and the bottom panel shows the market
share of various types of financing in the total financing of 2013. Data is
retrieved from the PBOC website. 
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Appendix 3: Translation of an inter-corporate loan announcement.
Stock abbreviation: Guiyan Boye        Stock code: 600459          No: Temporary 2011-4
Announcement of an entrusted loan to a fully owned subsidiary
The board of directors and all members declare that this announcement contains no false
documentation, misleading statement or omission of important items, and bare individual and
joint liability for the truthfulness, validity and completeness of the announcement. 
Important notices for the entrusted loan
Financial institution: Kunming  branch, China Citic Bank
Borrower: Guiyan Yimen Ziyuan Ltd (hereafter Yimen Ziyuan Ltd)
Amount: 30 million RMB
Maturity: One year
Interest rate: 7.07 percent per year
1. Summary
On Feb 25th, 2011, the eighth session of the fourth board meeting of the listed firm passes the
proposal of providing an entrusted loan to a fully owned subsidiary. The board agrees to
extend an entrusted loan of 30 million RMB to Yimen Ziyuan Ltd . This transaction does not
constitute a related transaction. This entrusted loan does not need an approval from the
shareholders’ meeting. 
2. Basic information about the borrower
Yimen Ziyuan Ltd is fully owned by the listed firm Guiyan Boye . It was set up on April 1st
2010 with the approval from the Industrial and Commercial Administrative Bureau of
Yimen County at Yunnan Province . It has a registered capital of 50 million RMB, with the
registered address: Xiaolongkou Meishicheng, Xihuan Road, Longquan Town, Yimen
County, Yuxi City, Yunnan Province . Main businesses of the firm: the development and
applications of the refinery skills for the resources of precious metals; the collection and
processing of second-hand resources of precious metals; the manufacturing of basic products
of precious metals; the manufacturing of special powder materials; the operation of skills and
products made by the listed firm (according to the approved project and maturity if the
operation involves special approvals by the laws). 
Up until Sep 30th, 2010, the total assets of the Yimen Ziyuan Ltd is 54.76 million RMB; the
total liabilities is 4.95 million RMB; total shareholders’ equity is 49.81 million RMB; net
profit is -188,000 RMB. None of the above numbers are audited by a third party. 
3. Main content of the entrusted loan
According to the demand of Yimen Ziyuan Ltd’s operation and development, the listed firm
provides an entrusted loan of 30 million RMB to Yimen Ziyuan Ltd . The loan has a maturity
of one year, and an annual interest rate of 7.07 percent. (Please refer to the signed contract
for the detailed items of the entrusted loan)
4. Sources of the fund for the entrusted loan
The fund is from the listed firm’s self-owned fund. Yimen Ziyuan Ltd will repay the principal
and interest in a lump sum at maturity. 
5. Purpose of the entrusted loan and its effect on the listed firm
The entrusted loan will be used for Yimen Ziyuan Ltd ’s operation and development. It will
not affect the listed firm’s normal operation as the fund is from the self-owned fund. Yimen 
Ziyuan Ltd  is fully owned by the listed firm, so it can repay the entrusted loan at maturity. 
Here announces the transaction. 
The board of Guiyan Boye Co. Ltd., 2011/2/26
Categories Balance 2010 year end Loan issued Loan received
Balance 2011 
year end
Subsidiaries with a full or 
controlling ownership 52.77 65.56 30.25 88.08
Subsidiaries or joint ventures 
without a controlling ownership 4.18 5.15 2.87 6.47
Unconnected parties 7.26 14.52 8.34 13.44
Other connected parties 0.18 0.78 0.19 0.77
Total 64.38 86.01 41.64 108.75
Data source: “An analysis on entrusted wealth management products and entrusted loans
in 2011 for firms listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange” released by Shanghai Stock
Exchange.
Appendix 4: The size of the entrusted loans in 2011 for firms listed on Shanghai
Stock Exchange (in billions of RMB). 
Appendix 5: Average abnormal returns for issuance and receipt of
inter-corporate loans in event window [-20, 20].
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Average abnormal returns for the receipt of inter-corporate 
loans
Log loan size 338 4.39 1.26 103 4.95 1.31 -3.90***
Spread 281 0.54 0.76 95 0.04 0.34 6.21***
Log maturity 312 2.56 0.61 99 2.63 0.57 -1.02
Guarantee 338 0.33 0.47 103 0.13 0.33 4.11***
Loan revision 338 0.11 0.32 103 0.06 0.24 1.61
Intra-group loan 338 0.62 0.49 103 0.85 0.35 -4.52***
Counter-party industry 308 0.42 0.49 96 0.41 0.49 0.27
Counter-party size 261 1.81 1.77 68 4.73 2.10 -11.64***
State-owned counter-party 332 0.55 0.50 103 0.67 0.47 -2.08**
Firm size 337 22.12 1.11 103 21.86 1.39 11,738 21.46 1.45 8.28*** 2.78*** 1.98**
Age 337 10.95 4.71 103 11.34 5.09 10,926 9.61 5.16 4.71*** 3.39*** -0.71
Market to book ratio 333 2.14 1.22 102 2.29 1.59 11,461 2.32 1.58 -2.01** -0.18 -1.02
Free cash flow 319 0.02 0.17 97 0.03 0.14 10,441 0.04 0.15 -2.29** -0.74 -0.94
Leverage 337 0.47 0.19 103 0.61 0.22 11,738 0.50 0.24 -2.69*** 4.81*** -6.64***
State control 337 0.71 0.45 103 0.67 0.47 11,050 0.51 0.50 7.24*** 3.24*** 0.76
Other accounts receivable 337 0.03 0.04 103 0.02 0.03 11,580 0.04 0.06 -2.80*** -2.16** 0.82
Other accounts payable 337 0.04 0.04 103 0.08 0.10 11,585 0.05 0.07 -4.07*** 3.84*** -6.21***
Appendix 6: Summary statistics for loan, counter-party and firm characteristics. 
Issuance v.s. 
No loans
Receipt v.s.  
No loans
Issuance v.s. 
ReceiptSt.Dev N Mean
Issuance of inter-
corporate loans
Receipt of inter-
corporate loans
Loan
Counter-
party firm
(Loan-
announcing) 
Firm
Log loan size is the logarithm of the amount of inter-corporate loans in millions of RMB; Log maturity is the logarithm of the loan maturity in number
of months; Spread is the percentage increase of the interest rate from the basis lending rate; Guarantee equals one if a loan is collateralized or
guaranteed by a third party, zero otherwise; Loan revision equals one if a loan revises previous loan terms, zero otherwise; Intra-group loan equals one
if the counter-party is in the same business group, zero otherwise; Counter-party industry equals one if the counter-party and listed firm are in the same
industry, zero otherwise; Counter-party size is the logarithm of total assets of the counter-party; State-owned counter-party equals one if the counter-
party is state-owned, zero otherwise; Firm size is the logarithm of total assets; Age is the number of years listed on the stock exchanges; Market to
book ratio is the market value of equity plus the book value of total liabilities scaled by the book value of total assets; Free cash flow is the free cash
flow over total assets; Leverage is the total liabilities over total assets; State-control equals one if the ultimate controller of the firm is state-owned,
zero otherwise; Other accounts receivable is the other accounts receivable over total assets; Other accounts payable is the other accounts payable over
total assets. The test of mean difference is conducted between firms, with issuance/receipt of inter-corporate loans versus firms without inter-corporate
loan announcements. T-statistics are reported with significance *** at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten percent level.
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Test of mean difference (T-stat)
